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ABSTRACT
The composition of an artillery system and its mission in a non-
nuclear environment is discussed. Four scenarios are defined in which
the artillery system must perform its mission, and the tasks are
detailed.
A concept for a measure of effectiveness (MOE) for artillery is
developed and a methodology is presented. The effects of the scenarios
on the MOE are analyzed and the constraints are discussed, A mobility
concept is developed and a definition is presented.
Costing concepts and techniques are presented with notation
developed for computer application to the artillery system costing
problem,, Some cost estimating relationships (CER's) are suggested.
A cost-effectiveness analysis is made employing the developed
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I INTRODUCTION
1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF ARTILLERY
The standard U.S. artillery weapons in September 1945 consisted
of seven towed howitzers, two towed guns, three self-propelled (SP)
howitzers, one self-propelled gun, one self-propelled mortar, one heavy
mortar, two rocket weapons, and three high speed tractors. Today the
U.S. Army has nine Standard A field artillery weapons, excluding
antiaircraft guns and artillery guided missile systems. If it were
technologically feasible, there are advantages to reducing the length
of the artillery weapons list even more, Fewer weapon types reduce
the logistic loads and training requirements. However, no two or
three artillery pieces have yet been designed to successfully fulfill
all the roles called for in an artillery system.
Specifically, artillery must be a flexible, mobile system capable
of varying increments of firepower against all the varying targets the
supported infantry units are likely to encounter in an engagement.
On the offensive, artillery must provide preparatory fires to soften
an objective immediately prior to an assault. If on the defensive,
artillery must -provide final protective fire on all avenues of approach
into friendly positions, and fire into friendly positions in the event
of enemy penetration. Once the enemy attack has been blunted,
artillery must be capable of pursuing the fleeing enemy by fire, and
capable of providing high angle indirect fire against targets on
reverse-slope terrain, i.e., hit targets on the far side of the mountain.
If enemy artillery fire is brought to bear against friendly positions,
friendly artillery must provide immediate counter-battery fires to
silence enemy guns. Lastly, artillery must provide interdiction and
harrassing fires to disrupt enemy communications, supply, movement,
and to reduce enemy morale.
Current heavy weapons designed for long range interdiction and
counter-battery fires cannot elevate sufficiently nor fire rapidly
enough for the short range, indirect, high volume of fire required
against large concentrations of enemy troops in the immediate vicinity
of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) . Likewise, the 107mm
mortar is useless against targets requiring the range or the penetrating
power of the eight-inch projectile.
Table 1.1 ARTILLERY WEAPON TYPES, 1945 AND TODAY
Total Number




:!• Excluding artillery guided missile systems, Table 1.1 reflects
the trend toward the streamlined, highly mobile, partially helicopter-
transportable infantry-supporting arms system. Airmobile artillery,
amphibious artillery, and artillery capable of significant increases
in rates of fire and ranges are current items of priority interest and
development [5, 13, 17, 23] Although field artillery fire control
procedures remained unchanged for several decades, the introduction
of new and better fire control equipment since WW II has improved
coordination and effective delivery of artillery fire. Panoramic
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US Armed Forces 1945 17
US Army (Standard A) 9
USMC 6
telescopes and other conventional aiming devices have been made more
accurate and easier to operate. Radar and other electronic means are
used whereby forward observers can more accurately determine range
to the target. The space age is influencing artillery development
by introducing new techniques for geographically locating weapons and
targets in the field. Many other significant advances have been
registered, one of the more important being the development of mobile
electronic equipment to automatically compute fire orders. [14, 20]
The trends have been established. The artillery system of the
future will likely be built around a few highly mobile, light-weight
weapons capable of a rate of fire several times that of today.
Automatic loading and computerized fire control systems will make it a
more formidable supporting arm indeed.
1.2 ROLE OF ARTILLERY IN THE SUPPORTING ARMS SYSTEM
As the artillery system of the future is developed, it should be
designed to be fully integrated with the other major supporting arms,
naval gunfire and close air support, The complementary blending of
these three systems will, to some extent, mold some of the features of
each co-system. In a combat situation, comparative capabilities and
limitations ought to be kept in mind when selecting the ordnance
delivery means. This same principle applies to the development of any
one of the three systems as well. If a new artillery system is being
contemplated which can attack targets at ninety kilometers, naval
gunfire and close air support should be considered as alternatives













Figure 1.1 THE SUPPORTING ARMS SYSTEM
Since the artillery system is a component of the supporting arms
system, care should be exercised that the capabilities of any other
component are not unnecessarily duplicated.
1,3 THE ARTILLERY SYSTEM
What comprises an artillery subsystem, which shall be referred to
as simply an artillery system? Figure 1,2 gives some indication.
Not all of the components shown exist wholly for artillery, but a
significant fractional value of the expended effort goes in support
of artillery For example, base facilities may house infantry, tank,
and other units, but some proportion of expenditures of dollars for base
;
i
maintenance and upkeep are directly or indirectly attributable to the





























At least two questions present themselves. What proportion of the
supporting component effort actually goes in support of the artillery
system, and how are the component subcomponents defined? If the
second question is pursued to the end, the ultimate subcomponent of
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NATIONAL RESOURCES
Figure 1.3 SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT COMPONENTS
all systems, as the figure above indicates, is the pool of national
resources. For simplification, only components directly supporting the
artillery units are usually considered. Costing of the support components
and of the artillery units should be done as accurately as time, detail,
and good judgment permit.
The answer to the first question may be available from historical
sources, provided future requirements do not differ too greatly from
past experience. Problems of unreliable estimation may be encountered
if extrapolations are carried beyond the range of past data. For
example, the number of required helicopter sorties per artillery unit
per unit of time in the future may be approximated by careful analysis
of the artillery unit's operations from past equal units of time.
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However, if total numbers of artillery units are doubled, or the system
is preparing to operate in an environment in which it has never operated
before, of if an entirely new artillery system with different logistics
and mobility requirements is about to be phased in, past operational
requirements for helicopters in the old system may bear no or little
relation to the new future requirements.
A skeletal example of a basic artillery system is the field
artillery regiment of the Marine division. The artillery regiment is
the primary source of fire support for the division and is currently
composed of the basic elements shown in Figure 1.3 with specific
support units omitted, such as external logistics support, helicopter
support, medical support, Marine Observation Squadron support, etc.
1.4 CONCEPT AND SCOPE
The purpose of this paper is to develop a technique whereby the
efficient, optimum selection of future alternative artillery systems
is possible. As mentioned, an alternative artillery system is the sum
total of all the specific numbers and types of equipment, weapons,
and personnel which is proposed for implementation as the operational
unite A proposal utilizing only one type weapon would be an alternative,
A system in which the 105mm howitzers were to be replaced by newer
models of 105 's is a different alternatives Yet another alternative
would be a system which simply adds one more battery of a current type
weapon to the system Finally, the system in being is an alternative
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Figure 1.4 MARINE ARTILLERY REGIMENT
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Once two or more alternatives are proposed, including the present
system, an efficient and hofpefully optimum-'- system can be chosen.
An efficient artillery system is one which inflicts no fewer than a
prescribed number of casualties against a given number of targets in
the various scenarios, and inflicts those casualties at the expenditure
of less national resources than any other feasible alternative.
A feasible alternative is one which meets all the constraints.
Figure 1.4 shows some relationships of six alternatives. The curve
represents the frontier of maximum attainable numbers of casualties
per engagement for a given budget. Of the six alternatives shown,
alternatives three and four are infeasible since they do not meet the
constraints , Alternatives six and two are feasible, and one and five
are efficient at different budget levels. System five is optimum for







Figure 1.5 CASUALTIES PER ENGAGEMENT VS ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM COST
Not necessarily a unique optimum. Multi-optima may exist,
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To accomplish the goal of selecting an optimum, efficient alterna-
tive it is necessary to restate the mission and tasks of artillery.
The mission and tasks must be performed in varying geographical and
climatological conditions which will be defined under the heading of
Scenarios. Scenarios will have an influence not only on the effective-
ness and costs of the artillery system in inflicting casualties, but
will also affect operating and maintenance costs and attrition on the
system.
It would be well to reduce the mission and task requirements to
a measurable expression which will truly compare alternative systems
and aid in selecting an optimum or efficient solution. This is the
purpose of the statement of the criteria for this paper: Of the
proposed alternatives which are able to inflict the minimum prescribed
number of casualties against a defined target, select that system
which has minimum non-engagement system cost and incurs minimum variable
cost per casualty per engagement.
Finally, the cost data and effectiveness data of the alternatives
must be compared and evaluated for a unique optimum solution if one
exists. Otherwise, trade-offs among equally efficient alternatives
v/ill be 'compared and a solution obtained based on some additional
decision criteria.
In attacking the problem of finding a procedure for selecting the
efficient artillery system, two simplifying assumptions or reductions
of the problem have been made. Only the artillery system is considered,
and the interplay of naval gunfire and close air support with artillery
17
have been excluded. Secondly, the scenarios put aside artillery's
nuclear capability and its implications of central war and thus
consider only conventional ordnance.
1 5 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The evolving artillery system of the future will be a sophisticated,
highly mobile, and computer-assisted array built around fewer weapon
types o The method of minimizing expected variable cost per casualty
and non-engagement system cost, while meeting minimum mobility and
casualty constraints, will select the desired alternative. Detailed
costing matrices of present battery types will be required in developing
cost estimating relationships as aids in designing and estimating costs
of future weapons
o
1 ,6 PLAN OF THE STUDY
The problem addressed by this paper is: Define a measure of
effectiveness and construct a cost-effectiveness model for evaluating
and selecting from among future artillery alternatives.
The plan of this study is first to describe the job that is
required to be done, or mission of artillery, and the environments
in which this job may reasonably be expected to be accomplished. From
there this paper will discuss effectiveness for an artillery system and
how to measure it, including the effects of the scenarios on the
artillery system, and will present a measure of effectiveness to
secure an efficient system. Next will be discussed the costing problem,
costing matrices for present artillery battery types, and the develop-
ment of cost estimating relationships. Finally, cost and effectiveness
will be compared for the selection of the optimum alternative. Included
will be a discussion of alternative decision criteria to be utilized in
the event of multi-optima alternatives to the artillery problem,
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II MISSION AND SCENARIOS
2.1 DISCUSSION
Mission . The primary artillery system mission is to "provide
close and continuous support to ground forces by neutralizing or
destroying those targets which constitute the most serious threat to
the supported unit", [3] Such support includes counterbattery fire,
attack of enemy reserves, restricting enemy movement, disrupting
enemy command systems and the destruction of other enemy installations.
To compare alternative systems for this mission it is necessary to
further specify the particular surroundings or environment in which
the system may likely operate. The specified area may impose additional
equipment or support requirements on the system, and consideration of
it lends to a more realistic evaluation of the system.
Scenarios . This environment in which the system must operate and
in which it is desirable to evaluate the system is called the scenario.
Consideration of the system operating in various scenarios is an
attempt to compensate for the uncertainty of the exact location in which
future artillery system operations are likely to occur. Figure 2,1 is
a representation of the specified mission and the set of environments
or scenarios in which the mission may be performed. Two primary
reasons come to mind for examining the system in the light of a
particular scenario. One is to determine the physical effects of the
environment on the operation and maintenance of the system. The second





Some of the scenario characteristics which cause physical effects
on the system are temperature, humidity, dust, and sand* They affect
the life expectancy, attrition, operating costs, and maintenance cycles
of the system. Producing casualties on the target will be affected
by the ability of the target and the artillery system to move in the
scenario, the ability to accurately locate on the ground both the
artillery weapons and the target, and the ability to see the target
to adjust fire on it. The presence and amount of land and/or vege-
tation mask must be considered since it will limit, somewhat, the
types of artillery weapons which will have the ability to fire on the
target.
Four scenarios are used in this paper. These are labelled the
ideal, the rain forest, the desert, and the mountain scenarios.
The next usual development in a cost-effectiveness study is to detail
the scenarioo Here such detail would prescribe exactly the temperature,
humidity, soil types, vegetation types and coverages;, seasonal
variations, vegetation heights, elevation of terrain, slope of
terrain, etc. However, the task is sufficient for at least part of
another report, and only the general characteristics are presented here.
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The general characteristics are enough for the moment to determine the
effects of these scenarios on the performance of the artillery system.
Tasks . Within each scenario are a set of tasks which must be
performed by the system to accomplish its mission. Task is here
defined as the type of target on which the system must inflict
casualties. A casualty is any enemy target rendered incapable of
performing its combat function, Figure 2,2 represents the tasks
within each scenario,
SCENARIO
Tasks are generally distinguished by personnel or non-personnel
targets and by hardness of target. Hardness corresponds to the
effective casualty producing radius of a particular bursting projectile
against a particular target. Each projectile will have a larger
casualty producing radius against soft targets, and smaller radii
against harder targets. For example, consider Table 2,1,
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Table 2.1 HYPOTHETICAL PROJECTILE EFFECTIVENESS VS
VARIOUS TARGETS
Casualty Producing Radius of
Types of Targets A Hypothetical Pro.1ect.ile (Meters)
Personnel








Tanks, armored vehicles 2
Pill boxes, reinforced positions 2
Counterbattery 10
This hypothetical round could produce casualties against troops in fox-
holes at 10 meters or less from the burst point and could damage
certain buildings 8 meters from the burst point. Particular targets
will often be mixed, troops will be defending from within fortified
positions or moving about in armored carriers, For this reason it is
convenient to reduce all tanks, crew served weapons, and emplacements
to their personnel equivalents,, For example, consider the above
hypothetical projectile against an enemy tank with a crew of four«
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The target would be considered as one personnel target of four persons,
and a casualty producing radius of two meters would be used to compute
the expected number of rounds required to inflict a certain percentage
of personnel casualties,
2.2 SCENARIOS
Rain Forest . There are three principal rain forest areas in the
world: the African, the American, and the Indo-Malayan,, These rain
forests comprise nearly one fourth of the continental land area.
The vegetation of these areas is dominated by tall growths of hardwood
trees, which in turn influence communications, observation, movement,
and the accurate mapping of the areas. These areas are characterized
by an annual average rainfall of over eighty inches, tree canopies
averaging over 150 feet high, and a variety of undergrowth ranging
from none in the virgin rain forest areas to veritable tangles of
impassable vines and brush in areas that have been cut over and then
allowed to lie fallow, [11 » 26]
Each task in such an area will involve locating and fixing the
target, adjusting fire and compensating for the canopy, and moving
to new firing positions.
Desert . Desert areas of the world are designated primarily on the
basis of their average annual rainfalls. Typically, the twelve desert
regions of the world average less than six inches of rainfall per year,
^Average rainfalls can be misleading. The hamlet of Dakhla in
the Sahara once went eleven years without a trace of rainfall, and yet
Dakhla has an average rainfall of five inches per year. [12]
23
with much of the Sahara averaging less than one inch of rain per year.
Along with sparse rainfall, the one-seventh of the land surface
which is desert is characterized by high temperatures. The low
humidity of the air lets the sun's rays penetrate the atmosphere and
heat the ground to an extent impossible in moister climes. Daytime
summer temperatures of 120° F are commonplace with the ground
temperatures often 30-50° above that. Night temperatures will
plummet 50° or more below the daytime high, again due to the lack
of humidity. Visibility is often limited by heat mirages and severe
dust and sand storms x^hich reduce visibility for days. Movement is
usually unrestricted by obstacles and barriers except during the
sandstorms and the infrequent rain showers. [12, 26, 28]
Mountains . Mountain areas are vaguely described in various
reference texts when it comes to defining the difference between a
mountain and a hill. Generally, mountain regions are given as those
where land masses rise more than three thousand feet above sea level.
Important to the artillery system in the discussion of this scenario
is not only the total height of the mountains above sea level, but
also the slope cr rate of gain in elevation of the land mass.
The general areas of the mountain regions of the world comprise
some 25% of the continental land area. Mountain areas are usually
typified by channelized routes of communications, large variations
in elevation within short horizontal distances, and meteorological
conditions which change rapidly and often unpredictably. Average
slopes usually exceed 30%, but include all the extremes that go to
make up an average Vegetation may vary from rain forest in the
lower elevations to only lichens and moss above the timber line which
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occurs around 12,000 feet above sea level. The run-off after a
plentiful rainfall is often heavy, and small streams may easily flood
as a result.
At higher elevations, such as Tibet where the average elevation
of the entire country is over 15,000 feet, atmospheric pressure is
reduced, temperatures vary over a wider range and weather is even
more unpredictable than in mountains of lower absolute heights.
Unusually low temperatures come on with nightfall, and winters are
characterized by extremely low temperatures with snowfall in varying
areas in amounts according to humidity. [11, 30, 31]
Ideal
. The ideal scenario considered here is a non-existent
perfectly mapped, flat, table-land which has invariable weather
conditions of standard temperature and humidity every day, no wind,
unlimited visibility, and a few low hills from behind which the
artillery pieces are unobservable by the enemy. There are no trees,
other vegetation, or land masses to mask friendly artillery fire or
to afford cover and concealment to the enemy targets. The region is
trafficable and communications are perfect.
Combinations . Taking rainfall, terrain slope, and temperature as
a basis for a three-dimensional scenario space, every possible target
location on any continent may be described in terms of the above
quantities. Many locations reduce to linear combinations of temperature,
rainfall, and slope. Rainfall and temperature combinations imply
the vegetation that accompany them, i.e., vegetation heights, types,
and amounts are direct functions of the temperature and rainfall. As an
example, consider the mountainous rain forest of northwestern
South Vietnam. This might be represented as in Figure 2.4, This figure
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is an obvious oversimplification of a complex terrain and climatic
condition, and it is perhaps a gross assumption to consider that
temperaturej rainfall, and slope are simple orthogonal vectors which
may be added by vector additions Yet, there may be value in appraising
the effects of a combination of the quantities in this way. All possible
effects on the artillery system may be considered and account taken of
the total computational errors which may be introduced into the system
as the result of operating in such a complex environment.
Annual Rainfall
Figure 2,3 VECTOR REPRESENTATION OF SCENARIO PARAMETERS
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Ill A MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
3.1 DISCUSSION
Developing a measure of effectiveness (MOE) which, along with
cost considerations, will accurately order alternatives so that the
most desirable one may be selected is a difficult problem that has
no unique solution in many cases. Three independent studies of the
same problem could possibly produce three independent measures of
effectiveness, each of which would be valid and each might even rank
all the alternatives in the same order, though not necessarily so.
Defining an MOE before fully understanding the mission, the scenarios,
and the basic system alternatives may lead to a precise measurement
of a wrong or poor performance parameter with a resultant ranking
of alternatives according to the wrong or poor criteria.
This chapter will attempt to carefully define a measure of
effectiveness (MOE) for ranking proposed alternative artillery systems
by first discussing what effectiveness is for an artillery system.
Next, a mathematical model will be presented in the form of an objective
function to be minimized. The parameters of the artillery system's
performance will be presented and then analyzed under the effects of
the scenarios previously discussed. Finally, the constraints to the
objective function will be presented, defined, and discussed.
What is effectiveness and how can it be measured? For a mechanical
engineer effectiveness might be the measure of the amount of work
obtained from an internal combustion engine. This effectiveness is a
function of the total energy producing fuel that was burned and the
efficiency of the motor. Effectiveness for a financial investor might
be simply the cash flow from his investments.
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In a similar manner, in the process of choosing an alternative
artillery system, the MOE will be a measure of some output being
realized for the investment in that particular alternative. It is at
this point that the investment picture becomes clouded for artillery
systems. What is the 'output'? It obviously isn't dollars, unless
enemy targets destroyed is somehow converted to dollars. How much
output or return is enough or satisfactory? How is the return best
measured, or can it be measured at all? Waat is the exact amount of
investment required in the artillery system to get enough return?
If the expected types and expected numbers of each target are held fixed
for each engagement in each scenario, and for a given fixed fraction
of casualties per engagement for each scenario, some conditions may be
stated that will define a return on an artillery investment:
Minimize; The vector whose components are Variable costs
per engagement and Artillery non-engagement
system cost
Subject to: Future budget constraints are not exceeded
Casualties inflicted/engagement = that required
Number of targets/engagement = that specified
The simplifying assumptions of fixed types and numbers of targets per
engagement is really the product of two foregoing assumptions <> First,
that all expected engagements in which artillery would logically be
employed will fall within minimum and maximum bounds for numbers and
types of targets o Obviously, the employment of artillery against one
lone enemy soldier might be questionable. In like manner, the enemy
is assumed to possess clear judgment, and would never mass or concentrate
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his forces beyond the limits of tactical efficiency into a formation
such as a phalanx of one hundred men wide by one hundred men deep.
The second assumption is that each artillery alternative examined
will satisfy the constraints of the problem, i.e.* that each alternative
will perform equally well within the minimum and maximum bounds for
the numbers and types of targets per engagement.
Examining the criteria and the constraints stated above, it might
be well to discuss the terms briefly at this point, and in more detail
later. Minimizing variable costs per engagement means reducing all
costs resulting from one combat engagement to the lowest figure possible.
Variable costs per engagement will include the costs of replacing or
repairing combat attrited weapons, equipment, and men, and the cost of
the projectiles expended against the enemy. One disadvantage of this
measure is that it will vary as a function of the number of engagements
fought and the frequency at which the engagements occur. However,
peacetime readiness costs will be minimized, and if the assumption is
made that the number and frequency of engagements will affect all
alternatives approximately the same as far as variable costs per engage-
ment go, then this criteria will still be accurate and reliable in
selecting an optimum alternative.
The artillery non-engagement system cost is the second component
of the measure of effectiveness (MOE) and is simply the total cost of
the alternative over its life less all variable costs incurred in combat.
Included in the system non-engagement cost are such items as RDT&E,
initial procurement, and readiness operations and maintenance costs
for the life of the system.
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The constraints set the bounds within which the alternatives must
lie The non-engagement system cost obviously must be less than or
equal to the planned future budget,, Costs do not normally occur at
one instant in time, but are spread over the lifetime of the system.
The system cost, then, will be a stream over time, and the planned
budget will likewise be an estimated budget stream over the corresponding
time intervale The next two constraints embody the assumptions stated
at the first of this section. The number of targets per engagement
will be as specified, and the alternative system must be capable of
inflicting at least the required numbers of casualties per engagement.
A plot of non-engagement system cost vs number of casualties
achieved in a specified engagement for various proposed alternatives
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Figure 3.1 COST OF THREE ALTERNATIVES FOR GIVEN CASUALTY LEVELS
30
represents system cost in a particular scenario S, and for this
instance system I will have the minimum non-engagement system cost
if the number of casualties per engagement is less than A' , If the
required number of casualties per engagement is between A' and B'
,
then system II is the proper choice for this three alternative example.
For any casualty rate above B', say C', then system III minimizes the
non-engagement system cost required to achieve the desired number of
casualties per engagement. The assumption is that each alternative
can achieve an incremental increase in casualties for some incremental
increase in system cost, excluding variable costs.
Figure 3,1 is the plot of three discrete artillery alternatives.
Theoretically, several other discrete alternatives may exist with
non-engagement system cost vs number of casualties per engagement plots
as shown in Figure 3,2. As sufficient alternatives are considered and
plotted, a composite curve, say V, emerges as a continuous boundary or
frontier of efficient alternative solutions to the problem. For example,
if A' casualties per engagement are required, A" is the minimum non-








Figure 3.2 EFFICIENCY FRONTIER FOR NON-ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM COST
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How do the two quantities, variable cost per casualty and non-
engagement system cost, vary for a given number of casualties inflicted
per engagement? An intuitive argument is presented via Figure 3,3,
Consider a third axis coming out of the paper representing casualty
level per engagement, then the curve in Figure 3,3 represents a plateau
at some casualty level in a particular scenario, such as rain forest,,
The system which has minimum non-engagement system cost Y-, has some
variable cost C^ Perhaps another alternative which has heavier
weapons of greater caliber has non-engagement system cost Y
,
but its
heavier projectiles are more efficient in the high canopied rain forest
with a resulting variable cost CL less than C, • As the non-engagement
system cost increases to the right, the cost of replacing attrited
equipment lost in the engagement will become the overriding factor and








Figure 3,3 VARIABLE COST PER CASUALTY VS NON-ENGAGEMENT
SYSTEM COST, CONSTANT CASUALTY LEVEL
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Table 3.1
LIST OF SYMBOLS FOR CALCULATING
VARIABLE COSTS PER ENGAGEMENT
Symbol Definition
E.' A vector (EX ,E2 , . , . ,Ep# Ep+ll . . . ,Ep+w> 1
of expected attrition of p types of equip-
ment and w types of weapons in scenario i
A replacement cost vector
( I li I2»»»» » Ip+i»»«« t Ip+w )
for the
p types of equipment and w types of weapons
£r
' A vector of costs per round (C r,,...,
C
r )
for w types of weapons
Rj ' A vector of expected numbers of rounds
expended per engagement (R^».
.
«
,RW ) ^ for
the w types of weapons in scenario i




JLi ' £r + £i ' I
K. Required number of casualties per engage-
ment for scenario i
C^ Average total variable cost per casualty







A vector of the variable costs per casualty






A vector of the non-engagement system
costs for the scenarios.
Y = (Y 1# Y2 ,Y3 ,YA )
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3,2 THE MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
The criteria for the artillery system, or the measure of effective-
ness (MOE) , has been briefly mentioned as the problem of simultaneously
minimizing the variable cost per casualty per engagement and the non-
engagement system cost As stated, the problem is one of minimizing
a two-component vector consisting of variable cost per casualty and
non-engagement system cost, and each of these two components is again
another vector consisting of four components each. The components of
variable cost and non-engagement system cost correspond to the
calculations obtained in the four scenarios using the notation as
given in Table 3 1„ In notation, the criteria is
Minimize (£, Y)
where C_ is the vector of variable costs per casualty and Y_ is the
vector of non-engagement system cost. More details of vector minimi-
zation will be discussed in Chapter V, but for now the details of
determining the components of the £ and Y vectors will be examined 6
If it happens that the system characteristics are determined and
the non-engagement system cost estimated before any prototypes are
built, then the continuous function outlined in Figure 3.2 would
apply,, If several discrete prototypes were currently in being, the
criteria might be modified somewhat to
Minimize (C, Y)
, j = l,2,...,n and n 2
J
which indicates that each discrete alternative j will be analyzed and
costed for its values of £ and Y, j taking on the values one to n and n
is greater than or equal to two. The- optimum solution will be that
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alternative which simultaneously has minimum £ and Y vectors over
all alternatives. If this unique solution does not exist, i.e., there
is at least one other vector which has either C or Y vector which is
less, then trade-offs and secondary criteria must be considered.
This will be discussed further in Chapter V.
The. Variable Cost per Casualty Vector . Table 3,1 defines some
of the values necessary in obtaining the value of the variable costs
per casualty for the various scenarios. Basically, the variable costs
per casualty are made up of the costs of combat attrition on the system
and the cost of the ordnance expended on the enemy targets in the
engagement. The vector E.in Table 3,1 has components which are the
numbers of each type of equipment, men, and vehicles enumerated one
through p, and the numbers of weapons by type one through w which are
expected to become casualties due to enemy action or as a result of
combat against the enemy in an engagement in scenario i. The vector
_£
has as components the replacement costs of each of the components of Ejj
and the inner product of these vectors, E^' J^, gives the attrition
costs per engagement for scenario i. One note of caution is that the
cost of replacement associated with personnel is only the training and
transportation costs involved in replacing personnel casualties and
is not a price tag on human life. It may be assumed that all personnel
losses will be equal among all alternatives for any given engagement,
and the need to consider friendly personnel losses per engagement will
be eliminated. If it is deemed that personnel losses must be considered
for all alternatives, regardless, then one solution might be to put
such a high price on each human life that no one could argue about it
and include this cost in the variable cost per engagement. This is
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usually impractical because of social, religious, and emotional
reactions t> A more realistic solution might be to change the criteria
to include the expected number of friendly personnel casualties,
Minimize ( C ,Y, £ )
where the vector Q is a vector of expected friendly casualties, one
component corresponding to each scenario.
The sources for determining the expected values of the components
of E. may be varied. Past combat experience will give some guide as
to personnel and vehicle losses that may be expected for a given sized
engagement. However, new technology, engineering, tactics and
environment effects will influence the vulnerability and the consequent
combat attrition of all system components, including personnel. Past
experience must be tempered, then»with judgment and a full appreciation
of current friendly and enemy capabilities . Possibly a better estimate
could be obtained by programming enemy capabilities into standard war-
game simulations, and analyzing their results against friendly forces
in the computer iterations, [16]
The replacement cost vector _I and the vector of costs per round
CL are simply the costs of replacing the combat attrited or combat
expended components of the system. However, R. , the vector of expected
number of rounds expended per engagement is not so straightforwardo
Each component of R. is an expected number of rounds calculated
according to the formulas given in Appendix I, and the components, when
summed, will be the-number of rounds required to inflict the desired
casualty level K. in each scenario i.
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Using a standard derivation under the assumptions stated in
Appendix I [16, 18], the expected number of rounds required to inflict
a given level of casualties K. per engagement is a function of the
area of the target (A
fc
) , the mean area of effectiveness (MAE) of each
round, and the circular error probability (CEP), These parameters,
At , MAE, and CEP, and the factors which affect them are given in
Table 3.2
Before discussing the perturbations of these parameters by the
various scenarios, some discussion of the number of casualties K^ for
each scenario i is in order. The number of casualties K^ is strictly
deterministic, and the assumption is that any target which is within
the specified mean area of effectiveness (MAE) of a particular bursting
projectile will be made a casualty by that projectile. As previously
mentioned, MAE will vary as a function of target type, position,
hardness, etc. In order to simplify the target and round calculations,
Table 3.2
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all targets may be given in terms of their personnel equivalents „ For
example, an enemy tank with a crew of four would be thought of as a
personnel target with an area equal to that of the tank, and the MAE
used would be that of the particular round against tanks . This will
reduce casualties per engagement K. to a single value instead of
requiring a vector of values listing all the various target types
«
Since the casualties per engagement K. is deterministic, and the variable
quantity is the number of rounds required to inflict K. casualties,
it might be desirable to add a probability statement which requires
that the probability of achieving K^ is greater than some arbitrary
value, say 0«,9 This probability statement can be transferred to the
expected number of rounds per engagement vector, JR^, by requiring the
expected number of rounds per engagement, which is an average value of
expectations obtained over some number of computer iterations, to be
greater than ninety percent of the individual expectations found on
each computer simulation,, In notation this may be expressed
P(K^* = K^) = P(m rounds inflict K^ or more casualties per engagement)
= 9
where K^* is a random variable and is the actual number of casualties
per engagement,, The variable m is a computer-derived expected number
of rounds required to inflict K^ casualties per engagement,,
The variable cost per casualty, from Table 3.1, is seen to be the
product of expected attrition times attrition costs plus expected
round expenditures times cost of rounds all divided by the number of
casualties per engagement K- The next question that might be asked
is, how is the variable cost per casualty affected by the scenario.
38
Weapons will have a certain set of conditions under which they will
function and perform optimally , and these conditions will be considered
prevalent in the non-existent Ideal Scenario. The MAE of each round
will realize its physical limits in the ideal scenario, the uncertainty
of the locations of the artillery weapon and the target will be
minimized and will reduce the CEP to a function of the random error
of the weapon system only. The expected number of rounds required
to inflict K. casualties per engagement in the ideal scenario will be
optimistic with respect to the other scenarios or what may occur in an
actual engagement,, Attrition due to combat can be expected to be
minimized in the ideal scenario, and a lower bound for variable costs
per casualty will be realized with respect to the other scenarios and
actual engagements
«
In rain forest areas, mapping is usually poor and distinguishing
landmarks are usually more obscured by the high tree canopy, [3] As a
result, increased uncertainty of the location of the artillery weapon
and the enemy target results in greater CEP's. Target area is usually
reduced in dense vegetation for command and control purposes, and will
result in a smaller probability of hitting the target by a single
round, as seen in Appendix I The observer has a decreased ability
to locate and adjust bursting rounds onto the target due to the muffling
effect of the tree canopy Shielding and deflection of the projectiles
by the high canopy will tend to reduce the MAE, The total effects of
increased CEP, reduced MAE, and reduced At will be to increase the
expected number of required rounds to achieve K.
,
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The effects of high temperatures and humidity associated with the
rain forest will tend to increase the numbers of men required to perform
a given work load above the number required under ideal temperature
and humidity conditions,, Preventive maintenance loads may increase
due to an environment which is conducive to rust and corrosion. As a
result, attrition of weapons and equipment will be expected to increase
above that expected in an ideal environments Tie total results of
increased expected rounds required to inflict K. and increased attrition
will be an increased expected variable cost per casualty for an engage-
ment in a rain forest over that expected in an ideal scenario.
Desert effects will be a markedly increased attrition of weapons,
vehicles, and equipment due to heat, sand, and grit [19], and an increased
attrition of personnel under combat conditions due to the effects of
heat and low humidity, [3, 12, 26] A desert engagement is character-
ized by mobility and an increased demand for movement against fleeting
targets, resulting in greater-than-ideal scenario wear and tear on
vehicles and equipment, contributing further to attrition of equipments
Fleeting targets, effects of heat mirages, dust and sand storms will
all reduce the accuracy of locating targets and the effectiveness of
adjusting fire onto the targets
In the mountain scenario the added uncertainty of elevation is
added to that of target location and weapon location, resulting in an
increased CEP over that obtained if locations and elevations are
exactly known By geometry1- it is seen that the effective CEP against
It will be more if the projectiles fall at an angle less than
90° onto a reverse slope of 30° o Firing at a fixed point P, half of the
rounds would be expected to fall within a horizontal circle of radius r
On a 30° slope, the same cone of fire projects to an ellipse with a
minor radius of r and a major radius of r/cos 30°. The new area,
instead of being pi times r^ t is now pi times r^ divided by cos 30°
for an increase of 16% over the horizontal CEP,
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targets appearing on reverse slope terrain may increase by as much
as 16% on a 30° slope due to the slope alone. However, CEP's will be
reduced on forward slopes by the same analysis. Uncertain and variable
meteorological conditions and the added burden of maintaining obser-
vation of reverse slopes by air or other means increases CEP's and
attrition costs respectively.
Mountain masses tend to mask or shield the fire of some weapons
and will place an increased requirement on high angle fire weapons.
High angle fire is characterized by greater CEP's and smaller caliber
weapons with smaller MAE's, Mountain masses will also channelize
communications and logistics routes increasing the vulnerability to
ambushes and enfilade fire and the expected attrition to an engagement.
The overall effect will be an expected variable cost per casualty
greater than that expected in the ideal scenario.
The Non-Engafiement System Cost Vector . Returning now to the basic
model presented at the beginning of this section, consider the second
component of the measure &f effectiveness vector ( £, Y ) , The non-
engagement system cost component Y is itself a vector composed of four
components Y., which correspond to the non-engagement system life
costs in each scenario i. The adjective 'non-engagement' is added to
indicate that the system cost considered here does not include the
variable costs that arise solely in the combat engagement. Such items
as training ammunition and normal stocks of spare parts are included
in the non-engagement system cost, but combat attrition and expenditures
of ammunition against an enemy are not. For any alternative being
considered, its minimun non-engagement system cost will be realized in
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the ideal scenario because weather and terrain conditions will be ideal,
resupply and movement will be unrestricted, and maintenance and oper-
ating conditions will be optimum.
Some of the effects of the rain forest on the non-engagement
system cost are those due to heat and humidity. Weapon and equipment
life cycles are shortened as a result of mildew, rust, and corrosion
resulting in higher total replacement costs over a given period of
time Personnel do not perform as well in excessive heat and humidity,
and this requires greater numbers of personnel plus greater numbers
of replacements to accomplish the workload.
Due to the high canopy and excessive vegetation, fewer firing
positions will be available,, Mobility of the basic weapon will be
reduced and there will be a requirement for special vehicles as a
result of lack of roads and trails and the existence of excessive
vegetation [3], Requirements may be generated for more or perhaps
new observation components for detecting enemy targets beneath the
canopy The canopy will inhibit or mask the firing of the weapons
on targets at certain ranges and will place an increased operational
requirement on the mortars and howitzers , The overall firing rate
and firing capability will be impaired as a result. In the event
the enemy artillery has well-prepared positions, increased vulnerability
to enemy counter battery fires may result.
Low humidity and high temperatures such as are found in the desert
scenario reduce the life cycles and the work cycles of equipment and
men. Preventive maintenance intervals will be shorter due to sand and
dust and chemical breakdown of lubricants due to excessive heat Greater
numbers of personnel will be required to perform the increased maintenance
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work load and to compensate for the debilitating effects of desert
heat. [2, 19, 28] Logistic support requirements will be increased
due to maintenance and personnel requirements and due to the nature
of desert warfare, i.e., warfare that is characterized by mobility
and slashing maneuvers of mobile troops. [3] The total effects of
the desert scenario will be to increase the non-engagement system cost
over that expected in an ideal scenario.
In the mountain scenario, mountain masses will tend to channelize
communications, inhibit mobility and freedom of movement, and place a
requirement on the system for a greater number of high angle of fire
weapons to meet the firepower requirements. Higher altitudes and low
temperatures will tend to reduce the tempo of operations due to human
tendency to fatigue more rapidly in these conditions. Above certain
altitudes helicopters may become ineffective for tactical and logis-
tical support. These factors combine to result in a reinforced
artillery system when compared to that required in the ideal scenario.
To summarize, the non-engagement system cost will increase as
humidity and average rainfall decrease to desert conditions from a
standard day or ideal conditions. Non-engagement system cost will
also increase as humidity and rainfall increase to rain forest conditions
from the standard day or ideal conditions. Desert conditions will
require increased operations and maintenance costs, increased personnel
costs, and increased logistics costs. Rain forests may require more
firing units since mobility is hampered, or may require more helicopter
units to attain an acceptable capability to displace rapidly. Mountains
require a preponderance of high angle of fire weapons, an increased
observation system to observe reverse slope terrain, and increased
A3
firepower means to overcome the vulnerability imposed by channelized
communications o Also, higher altitudes will cause a loss of efficiency
of personnel and support helicopters
3 3 THE CONSTRAINTS
The basic constraints to the solution of the model proposed in
this section are given in section 3„1. The first is that the non-
engagement system cost be equal or less than the budget „ As developed
more fully in Chapter IV, all the costs do not normally occur at one
single point in time, so that the system costs are incremental over
some period of time These periodical costs should be equal to or less
than the planned budget before their associated alternative is even
considered as a possible solution,, The second constraint requires
that the casualties inflicted per engagement is greater than or equal
to the number specified,, If the alternative system cannot inflict
the degree of destruction required, there is no need in examining that
particular alternative,, The third constraint was that the number of
targets per engagement must be specified, although this may be thought
of more as an assumption than as a constraint since it does define the
engagement
Four other constraints are implicit in those stated in section 3 1
and should be mentioned,, The first implied constraint concerns the
maximum range of the system,, The minimum acceptable maximum range
must be stated to provide for the counter battery task in each scenario,,
The second implied constraint is that of continuous coverage, i e
,
the
proposed alternative mix of mortars, howitzers, and guns must provide
artillery coverage from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA)
continuously to the minimum acceptable maximum range stated above,,
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If holes exist in the artillery coverage, the enemy need only slip
his own artillery into such a 'hole' and decimate friendly artillery
at will. The two remaining constraints which will be discussed a
little more at length are the implied mobility constraints and the
implied technological constraints.
A weapon which could devastate any known target with one single
shot out to a range of ten miles at a cost of only five dollars per
round would have limited use, in most instances, if it could not be
transported on a ship, lifted by an aircraft, or pulled by a truck.
If this mythical weapon could be instantaneously manufactured at any
chosen spot, all the transportation restrictions might be circumvented.
However, in the usual instance, pghility, the characteristic of dis-
placing from one position to another to engage in combat, adds to the
effectiveness of the system. A weapon or vehicle that is described as
being highly mobile is usually capable of moving across various types
of soils inclined at various slopes at speeds described as fast or
good. How mobile is 'highly mobile' and how fast is 'good'?
One method of quantifying the mobility characteristics of a
system, is to define the constraint vector T^ which is a vector of the
minimum times in each of the scenarios for any battery of a system to
displace a given specified distance in each scenario and to commence
firing on the new target from the new firing position. The standard
distance in each scenario might be some fraction of the maximum range
of the weapon mix, and would contain typical terrain, vegetation, and
obstacles representative of the scenario. Each component T. of the
vector T^ would correspond to a scenario i, and would be measured from
the time the first artillery tube of the particular battery ceases
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firing and begins the displacement until the time the last weapon of
the battery which is displacing begins firing on the new target from
the new position This vector of displacement times T_ would be required




where X-ax is arbitrsrily assigned or may be a vector of the average
times of the current operational system in displacing over the prescribed
distances and obstacles in each scenario.
The times to displace will be some function of the weapon weight,
the scenario, and the technology of the mobility mode selected, i e
,
whether the weapon is towed, self-propelled (SP) , an amphibian, or
helicopter transportedo The determination of the optimum mode or mix
of modes for artillery mobility is a topic for another research paper
Technological constraints exist which relate weapon system character-
istics to the measure of effectiveness (MOE) of the alternative • Stating
that relationship may be something of a problem, but there is a recog-
nized limit to the current state-of-the-arto Current technology can
only do so much, projectiles can be made to have only some maximum MAE
and inflict only so many casualties in a given area, helicopters can
fly only so fast in displacing artillery units, etc The components
of the variable cost per casualty vector C_ are functions of attrition,
replacement costs, expected expenditures, and costs per round of
ammunition, or
C » F-, (attrition, replacement cost, number of rounds fired,
cost per round of ammunition, caliber of round)
and each of the components are functions of other variables Attrition
will be a function of temperature, humidity, terrain slope, number of
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moving parts in the piece of equipment, number of enemy targets opposing,
number of rounds fired, and others, Equipment replacement costs and
ammunition costs will be functions of equipment or weapon weight and
size, calibre, number of moving parts, maximum range of the weapon or
round, etc. The number of rounds fired to defeat the target will be
a function of MAE and CEP which in turn are functions of the weight of
the round, muzzle velocity, rate of fire, range to target, canopy height,
caliber, angle of fall, height of burst, location error, and others as
indicated in Table 3,2, Standard regression programs exist at most
computer facilities, and these programs will use past data of weapon
types to compute coefficients of the parameters to define an approximate
function F, for predicting C, However, the value of F-^ for predicting
C when the new alternative characteristic parameters are outside the
ranges of values of the past data requires judgment. If all the past
calibers have been in the range from 81mm to 175mm, F^ might not be so
useful for extrapolation in estimating C for a 250mm weapon.
If continuous second partial derivatives of Fi could be assumed
or determined, perhaps a better use of F^ would be to determine the
minimum C by the classical method of setting the first partial deriva-
tives with respect to the parameters equal to zero and solving the
resulting set of simultaneous equations.
In like manner, the non-engagement system cost Y is some function
of the number of targets per engagement, the temperature and humidity,
slope of terrain, caliber of weapon, and the mobility mode cost, among
others, By regression analysis, some function F? could be determined
which should have a shape similar to Figure 1,5, The minimum Y will
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now depend on the desired casualty level, the required mobility mode
which meets time constraints, environment parameters, and others,
and will be determined from the graph by picking off a Y for a given
casualty level K^ 4 The same restrictions pertaining to the use of F,
apply to the use of F20
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IV THE COST MODEL
4.1 DISCUSSION
Costing is the other side of the weapons-system-evaluation coin,
effectiveness being discussed previously. A myriad of references
present the rationale, logic or reasoning behind costing and the various
techniques employed in costing a system. [1,2,4,6,27] Two approaches
may be taken depending on whether the alternative being evaluated is
a prototype weapon which has been independently developed or whether
the alternative is a new weapon to be designed and developed. Histori-
cally, artillery weapons have usually been the result of the former
process. However, for costly alternative systems of the future some
derivation of cost estimating relationships (CER's) may be necessary,
since prototype production may be too costlv.
Most authorities divide the weapon system cost analysis problem
into three parts: research and development, initial investment, and
annual operations and maintenance costs. The cost elements might
look like Table 4.1, where a cost element is a source or unit of the
system or system support which requires dollars for purchase or
operation.
Some typical problems in evaluating cost elements should be
mentioned. Determining system requirements from testing of the complete
system, item I.c in Table 4,1^ is often done by deriving expected
values from war game simulations, especially for ammunition requirements,
Weapon and shell characteristics are programmed into the computer, an
array of targets is advanced against the gun positions, and the computer
calculates how many rounds were fired to achieve a certain level of
casualties. Since it is impossible to place an entire system in the
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Table 4.1 TYPICAL CLASSIFICATION OF WEAPON SYSTEM COST ELEMENTS
Io Research and Development
a<> Preliminary research and design studies
b Design and development of subsystems
Co Test of the complete system
IIo Initial Investment
a Prime mission equipment
b Support equipment
Co Initial spares, spare parts and stocks, ammunition
d Initial training
e Initial travel, transportation and miscellaneous
fo Military installations
III Annual Operations
a Pay and allowances
b Equipment and installations replacements
Co Equipment and installations maintenance
do Replacement training
e Consumables, POL, training ammunition
f Recurring travel, transportation, miscellaneous
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field and employ it against an actual enemy to test it, computer
simulations are probably the most feasible and least costly method
of testing a system. It is well to keep in mind a few limitations
of the computer analysis, however.
The first limitation concerns the expected number of rounds
required to inflict the given casualty level K., If M is the number
of rounds required to inflict the casualties, M has some mean m and
some variance /T , One value of M is observed on each computer run,
and the total sample of M's over some number of computer iterations is
used to estimate m. However, it is just as important to know something
of the range of values M takes on and how often M falls within that
range. The variance (J*2 gives some idea of that range of values,
and was used by Chebyshev to show that the probability that M will
exceed its mean ra by more than some multiple of the standard deviation
(T'is less than the inverse square of the multiplier of (T*. For example,
P(|m - m|?h (T) ^ 1/h2 ,
or the probability that the required number of rounds to neutralize a
target exceeds the mean value m by more than h standard deviations is
equal or less than 1/h2 , If h is two and the standard deviation is 9,
then the probability that the number of rounds required to neutralize
a target varies from the mean by more than 18 is equal or less than
1/h2 or one-fourth.
The second limitation concerns simulation programming. It is
difficult to simulate topography, target detection and location problems
such as poor visibility and jungle canopy, and maneuvering forces.
All weapon types are assumed to perform equally well for the given
computer simulation, when such is not the case. Most scenarios for
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computer simulations are specific locales, geographical locations,
and consider little more than significant barriers to movement and
major topological features.
Another difficult problem that may arise in determining total
system cost is the problem of joint costing. If a costing unit such
as a helicopter squadron is common to two or more other systems such
as artillery and infantry, it may be a difficult chore deciding just
what fraction of the helicopter effort and resultant helicopter
squadron cost should be attributed to the artillery, The usual rule
is to determine, as nearly as possible, the usuage by the various
systems of the common unit, and assign the cost of the common unit
accordingly,, If the helicopter squadron mentioned above is based
aboard an LPH, the problem is extended once more: what portion of
the total LPII cost goes to support the helicopter squadron which is
supporting the artillery?
Some costs should not be considered in comparing alternatives.
If certain facilities are already available, or a required subsystem
is common to all proposed alternatives, then these need not be con-
sidered in the cost-effectiveness analysis. The first case is an
example of 'sunk costs', money which has been irretrievably spent
on a subsystem or a support element, but the subsystem or element
still has some value remaining. If somehow the old facility could be
used for some other purpose besides supporting artillery, then the
value to the other purpose besides artillery would have to be con-
sidered as an opportunity cost and would be included in the artillery
system cost. The RDT&E costs and the initial investment costs of the
current system are examples of sunk costs and will be omitted when
comparing new alternatives to the current system. Only attrition and
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annual operation and maintenance costs need be considered when comparing
the present system against some alternative. In the second instance
above, that of a required subsystem being common to all proposed
alternatives, only the planning budget constraint must be met, i.e.,
the cost of the common subsystem + the cost of the proposed alternative
must be equal to or less than the planned budget. Consideration of
the costs of each alternative need not include the cost of the common
subsystem,
4.2 THE PROTOTYPE MODEL
Before evaluating a newly proposed artillery system against the
current system, it is necessary to have a standardized costing procedure.
If there is any bias in a costing technique, it is hoped all alternatives
will become equally biased by using the same procedure for all, and
that the ordering of the alternatives will remain the same. The cost
matrix in Figure 4.1 outlines a costing procedure for the current
system by omitting the XX items. The system costing will break down
into five broad categories of costing elements: the basic artillery
unit, usually a battery; the targeting and fire control subsystem;
facilities; surface ship-to-shore transfer craft; and vertical assault/
support squadrons. For each costing element the following items
must be taken into account: RDT&E, investment costs, maintenance and
attrition, personnel of the unit, support personnel who are attached
to the unit or support the unit from some rear echelon, POL and other
consumables, and shipping requirements.
Current System . For the current system all RDT&E and investment
costs are sunk costs and need not be considered. Personnel, maintenance
and attrition, and POL and other consumables costs are historically
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TYPE COST UNIT ANNUAL COST
RDT&E INV MAINT & PARTS PERS SPT PERS POL SHIPPING
Battery
Artillery Piece XX XX X X X - LST
Prime Movers XX XX X X X X LST
Support Vehicles XX XX X X X X
Ammo XX XX - - X -
Target Detection XX XX X X X -
FDC XX XX X X X -
Shore Facilities XX XX X X X - -
Surface Shin-Shore
Transfer Veh XX XX X X X X LPD
Assault Amph XX XX X X X X LPD
Vertical Assault
Helicopters XX XX X X X X LPH
SPT Equip XX XX X X X X LPH
Facilities XX XX X X X
1
-
Figure 4 1 COST MATRIX FOR AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM
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documented and are readily available. As previously noted, major
problems may present themselves in apportioning the proper fraction
of costs of shipping, support equipment and personnel, facilities,
and surface/vertical assault/support to the artillery battery. If any
of these are common to all alternatives, they may be omitted from the
costing effort.
Using vector and matrix notation, it is possible to set up the
problem of determining total battery costs, B^ total» ^or comPuter
computations. Let the numbers from Figure 4,1 be compiled into the
battery cost matrix A^ where the subscript i refers to battery type
for n types of batteries. Define a vector JS. which will be a vector
of coefficients or multipliers corresponding to the costing units
listed in the left column of Figure 4,1 for a total of twelve components
in the vector. Then define By* as a vector of costs, each cost
component of the vector corresponding to a column of the Figure 4,1,
excluding the first or left hand column. In notation,
li* ' = li ' Ai
and from this equation,
Bi total = I' &L*
where J^ is the sum vector. If there is a discount rate r being applied,
then
B i total - £' li*
where J)' is a vector of discount factors and B^ is now the present value
of the discounted battery costs.
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For a simplified example consider the following hypothetical
Type 1 gun battery
A-, » the cost matrix similar to Figure 4,1
100 .............. C 100,000
o 1DU oooooooooooooo^-J e
50,000
375 ..... .
Each column of Ax corresponds to one of the columns of Figure A 1
Each element of each column represents an average marginal cost per
unit of the cost units in the left hand column. In this hypothetical
example, the RDT&E and investment costs are sunk and the elements of
A, corresponding to these are all zeroes. The annual cost of mainte-
nance and parts per artillery piece is 100, cost of shipping per
artillery piece is 100,000, etc, Bj' is the vector of coefficients of
the number of units to be costed, and in this hypothetical example is
( 6, 6, 10, 200, 1, 3,o o o o • o o o) where the fractions represent that
portion of the support subsystem utilized by battery type Bp In this
instance 0.1 of the target detection subsystem effort is utilized by
battery type 1 The vector of costs attributable to RDT&E, Investment,








A' Jil* if the discount rate is % and
I)' B_, * where D' is a vector of discount factors
if r is the discount rate
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If there are n types of batteries and m. of each battery type, then
the total lifetime operating cost for the artillery system being
considered is
n
Y " ?»i Bi total
1-1
The time phasing of costs and the discounting procedures which may
be employed are discussed in section 4.5.
The rigorous and arduous task of determining matrices A^ for all
types of artillery batteries may seem overly burdensome at first.
However, the task is required in order to accurately determine total
lifetime operating systems cost, time phasing of costs, cost of adding
one additional battery of type i, and for developing reliable Cost
Estimating Relationships (CER's) for proposed future alternatives.
The CER's will be predictors which will hopefully accurately relate
such items as maintenance and operating costs and attrition costs in
a particular scenario to the investment costs and the characteristics
of the alternative. Another useful CER will be one relating the weight
and volume of an alternative to its shipping or helilift costs.
Other results of the rigorous development of the cost matrices
will be a determination of those cost items which are relatively insensi-
tive as to battery type and those items which may be common within or
between battery types. For example, the costs of the targeting and
fire control subsystem are probably relatively constant from battery
type to type. Within all batteries of a particular type, it would not
be unreasonable to expect all personnel requirements to be the same,
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p erhaps the numbers of required support personnel as well,, Analyzing
the output of the costing matrices of two or more alternatives will be
discussed in Chapter V
The Prototype Alternative „ The basic cost matrix in Figure 4 1
applies with the columns for RDT&E and Investment included where
applicable,, Again, RDT&E and investment costs of components of the
current system are sunk costs and are omitted from the costing of any
alternative which incorporates those components. The same computer
programs used to evaluate the current system will be used for the
alternative The CER's developed from data on current systems will be
used to estimate such items as proposed alternative operations and
maintenance costs, personnel costs, etc., provided the characteristics
of the proposed alternative are comparable to those of the system on
which the CER's ^were based The validity of the CER's cannot be
assumed for all possible alternatives,,
The costs for RDT&E in developing the prototype are historical
and will prove useful in predicting initial investment costs for the
alternative, i e
,
initial investment cost f ( RDT&E, weapon characteristics )
where the RDT&E costs may reflect the degree of technological sophisti-
cation of the alternative If the RDT&E costs are considered sunk
costs for the company developing the prototype, they will be recovered
by an increased investment cost,, If RDT&E is on-going, the costs will
be time phased over some expected period of development and will be
discounted at an accepted discount rate
Initial procurements will likely be time phased rather than a lump
sum purchase, if for no other reason than that the manufacturing rate
has some limit. The training of personnel to operate the new equipment
will be phased over some time, as well, and it would be uneconomical
to have large inventories of the new weapons on hand for any great
length of time prior to the completion of training of the personnel
to operate them.
4.3 NEW DESIGN COST MODEL
The new design will be limited by technology and the state-of-the-
art of artillery systems. Relating these designed weapon characteristics
xtfill be the job of CER functions such as those discussed in section 3.3.
For example, the variable cost per casualty, C, and the non-engagement
system cost, Y, can be estimated from their parameters:
C = F
1
(weight of the weapon, weight of the projectile, length
of the tube, muzzle velocity, rate of fire, range to the
target, number of enemy targets, number of moving parts
per weapon, temperature, humidity, height of burst,
angle of fall, etc.)
Y F2 (number of targets, mobility mode cost, caliber of weapon,
projectile weight, temperature and humidity, etc.)
After the characteristics have been selected, the CER's will be used
to estimate all the items of the cost matrix in Figure 4,1 that apply
to the proposed alternative. Estimates must also be made of the time
phasing of RDT&E and production schedules for the initial investment
so that appropriate discount factors may be applied to the cost items.
59
Past history has shown the feasibility of the prototype method
of developing a proposed alternative, although to determine if it is
the optimum method would require further research. It is likely that
pure cost estimating will be less costly than the prototype approach
for weapons requiring large outlays for RDT&E and initial investment
or for testing and evaluation Just how large is 'large' would be
one result of the proposed paper»
4 A MARGINAL COSTS
The requirement exists for knowing the marginal cost with respect
to the current base system of one more battery of each particular type.
When considering proposed alternatives, increasing the present system
by l,2 |00t> batteries should be one of the proposals evaluated. The
average marginal cost will vary with the number of additional batteries
proposed, but should be considered in the light of potential future
growth tendencies of force units requiring artillery supports Also,
the average marginal costs of additional batteries will reflect the
costs that might be incurred in the event that a conflict results in
ballooning of forces Two cases will be discussed, when excess capacity
exists capable of manning and supporting an additional battery, and when
only partial or no excess capacity exists.
If excess personnel, facilities, and other support are available
to handle the additional increment of artillery being considered, then
only the initial investment costs of the weapons and attendant special
support equipment plus the operating and maintenance costs need be
considered in the marginal cost of the battery. However, the excess
capacity implies inefficient use of some of the affected resources,
and that the actual operating and maintenance costs of the additional
60
battery will be less than the average of the other batteries of the
same type. In fact, in this instance the additional operating and
maintenance costs will consist only of the attrition costs and the
consumables costs. Historically , this case seldom if ever exists.
Manpower is always a problem, and excess facilities occur only during
the logical planning for future expansion, and are not really 'excess'
at all,
Partial or no excess capacity is the more usual case when con-
sidering the marginal costs of one more battery. The same base is
usually capable of handling one more unit at the expense of a few
more buildings and a few additional support personnel. The costs
of the new buildings and the few extra support personnel would be
directly attributable to the added artillery battalion, but the cost
of the land on which the buildings were erected would not as long
as they were erected on the base property. If two, three or more
additional batteries were to be considered as an alternative, then
their average marginal costs might well involve the full cost matrix
of Figure A.l less the RDT&E costs.
4.5 TIME PHASING OF COSTS, COSTING SCHEMES AND DISCOUNTING
A typical system that is built and implemented from scratch might
have an expenditure sequence that looks like Figure 4,2, For systems
as stable and long-lived as artillery, as contrasted with short-lived
computer systems for example, the careful phasing and programming of
the future costs are necessary to determine the true alternative costs
when any discount rate greater than % is considered, [2] Just what
that discount rate r should be is the subject of considerable debate
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Five-Year System Cost , The main advantage of the simplicity of
this method is over-shadowed by the dangers of omitting seemingly minor
costs such as build-up costs, and the omission of time value and unequal
lifetime considerations. [2] RDT&E costs are added to initial invest-
ment costs and the estimated costs of operations for five years. It is
usually assumed that operating costs do not vary over the five years.
The hope is that the relative costs of the alternatives are not unduly
influenced by the choice of the five year base and the lack of careful
time phasing of costs. This method assumes no time value of money.
Present Cost . Using the present cost scheme, cost streams are
discounted to their equivalent present values, and the time horizon
is chosen as the least common multiple of the estimated life times
of the alternatives. As mentioned previously, the concepts of dis-
counting and the selection of a proper discount rate are discussed in
many sources. [2, 25, 27] A primary requirement for the use of the
present cost technique is the careful preparation or estimation of the
yearly incidence of the costs related to the alternative. Several dis-
count rates may be stated and their results compared.
Annual Cost . Costing by this technique is similar to the present
cost method discussed above, except that total system costs are trans-
formed to an equivalent uniform annual amount by dividing the total
cost by the number of operating years. Least common multiple lifetimes
are used, and if the discount rate is taken to be zero percent for a
system whose life is five years, annual cost would be very similar
to the five year cost simply divided by five.
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The following hypothetical example compares alternative cost
streams for two fictional alternative defense systems, and is taken
from Appendix B of [2] Buildup costs are omitted for simplicity of
presentation, and would normally be shown in the present cost and
annual cost techniques , Alternative A is represented by a cost pattern
requiring an initial investment now of $1000 and recurring annual costs
of $100 o The lifetime of A is ten years. Alternative B is an existing
system whose annual operating costs are expected to increase by a uni-
form amount to extend its operational life. In this comparison,
alternative B is favored by all techniques except for present cost
estimated at five percent over twenty years and annual cost at five
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Figure 4.3 ALTERNATIVE COST STREAMS SUMMARIZED
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V COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND DECISION CRITERIA
5 1 DISCUSSION
In the problem as developed by this paper, effectiveness is held
constant for all competing alternatives and the costs vary according
to designs and weapon characteristics , An engagement has been defined
by numbers and types of targets and the level of casualties has been
fixed per engagement Through computer simulations or through straight
calculations of projectile effects, CEP effects and scenario effects,
expected numbers of rounds per engagement plus attrition costs will
transform into expected cost per casualty per engagement. The next
question iss How does one take the estimated non-engagement system
cost and the expected cost per casualty values for each system alter-
native and make a selection of a system to be used?
5 2 THE CRITERIA
From the chapter on effectiveness, consider a plot of the coordinates
of the objective function: Minimize ( C_, Y ). over the alternatives
J
j = l,2,ooo,n Such a plot of 7 alternatives might resemble Figure 5„lo
One plot will be prepared for each scenario (i = 1,2,3,4) for a total
of four plots o The Y axis corresponds to the non-engagement system
cost, and the C axis represents the variable cost/casualty/engagement
in scenario i The efficiency frontier curve, Cj>, is as defined in
Chapter I
Simply stated, the decision rule inferred by the criteria above
iss Select that alternative j* which is feasible and which dominates
all other alternatives j In this particular scenario system D clearly
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dominates all other systems. Dominance is defined here in the standard
manners
if YDi<^ Yji where J* - D and for all j j D
and if CDi S C
j
±
then system j* «» D dominates all other systems j j D in scenario i.
Further, if system j* D dominates all systems j ?* D over all





COST/CASUALTY vs NON-ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM COST, SCENARIO i
Figure 5.1
Now consider the case where D has not been determined for one reason or
another. For alternatives 1, 5 and 6 the following conditions holds
Y
li» Y5i »
Y6i < Y2i» Y3i. *4i and
Cli» C5i» C6i <C C2i» C3i» C4i
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so that alternatives 1, 5, and 6 dominate alternatives 2, 3, and 4
in scenario i» However, the relations between alternatives 1, 5, and
6 are as follows:
Yli<£ Y6i< Y51 «d
c li > c6i >C51
and there is no dominance between these alternatives* If conditions
were such that a new alternative, (15), could be generated by taking
a linear combination of alternatives 1 and 5, i.e., a new mix could be
generated consisting of
a(Alternative 1) + (1-a) (Alternative 5) where ^a ^1
then alternative 6 would be dominated by (15) since
a Yu + (1 - a) Y51^Y6i and
a Cu + (1 - a) C5i ^C61 or
Y (15)i< Y6i and
c (15)i< c6i
If this new linear combination of alternatives 1 and 5 dominated alter-
native 6 for all scenarios i, then alternative (15) would be absolutely
donimant and would be selected as the optimum alternative.
Consider the case where linear combinations are infeasible due
to large research and development outlays or other costing considerations
which must be made for each alternative and which would result in some
Y (15)i X Y6i ^or any one or a^^ *• Re**plot Figure 5,1 for all scenarios
and determine the set of alternatives for each scenario which dominate
all other alternatives in that scenario, but which do not dominate one
another, similar to alternatives 1, 5, and 6 in the above plot.
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Suppose the results were the following:
Scenario Dominating Alternatives
1 1, 5 # and 6
2 1 and 5
3 5 and 6
4 6
Their plots might resemble the following Figure 5.2,
'Jl 'J 3 'J A
jl Y j2 Y j3
Figure 5.2 PLOT OF THREE DOMINATING ALTERNATIVES
:
J4
From the Office of the Secretary of Defense or other sources the likeli-
hood of conflict in the various areas of the world would be obtained if
possible so that a probability distribution for conflict in scenario i
may be derived. Then
pj probability of conflict in scenario i
jh
.
p * » 1, and define
i=lA»
Z! = (PiiPztPstPA^ and
Zi ™ £' ( .£• — ^1 wne re ( £$ J), is a four by two matrix
consisting of the two column vectors £ and Y_
corresponding to alternative j
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V the weighted average cost/casualty/engagement and the
-J
weighted average non-engagement system cost for
alternative j, in this instance j = 1, 5, and 6
- ( C*, Y*)j -
Plot these values of (C*, Y*). and the results may look like the
following Figure 5 3
CASE A CASE B
Figure 5 3 ALTERNATIVES IN WEIGHTED SCENARIOS
If case B occurs, then the scenario-weighted values of alternative 5
will cause that system to dominate 1 and 6« However, if Case A
occurs, resort may be made to other decision considerations such as
the effectiveness criteria for mobility The Defense Department
estimate of the expected numbers of engagements per year may be combined
with the cost per casualty per engagement criteria as another basis
for alternative selection,,
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5,3 SECONDARY DECISION CRITERIA
Expected Number of Engagements per Year . In the event that no
alternative is dominant as defined in section 5,2, the expected numbers
of engagements per year may be utilized to select an optimum alter-
native. From section 5,2, p. is the probability of conflict in
scenario i, given that an engagement or conflict occurs. If it is
indicated that E is the expected total number of engagements per year,
and that this expectation should hold for the next k years, k 1,2,,,,,
then
E^ = PjE m expected number of engagements per year in scenario i
Ej C.. K^ = expected total variable cost per year in scenario i
for alternative j, in this example j = 1 and 5
k




Depending on how far into the future the current expectation E may
be projected, k = 1,2, , and let
TVCj k - k TVCj and define
k k
Y. « Y*. + TVC. = weighted total expected system cost for
k years as differentiated from the non-
engagement system cost Y
If it happens that for some j = j* that
k • „ kYj*/ Yj for all j + j* and all k
then system j* is optimum by this method.
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Mobility o In the event that all Y. are reasonably close in value,
mobility may be used as the discriminating factor in selecting the
optimal system j* Since the alternatives being considered are feasible,
they have met the mobility constraints given in the effectiveness
chapter Now consider the following:
t- « P' T = x^eighted average mobility time, where P' is as
defined in section 5.2 and T. is as defined in
Chapter III
The decision criteria becomes: select system j* such that
tj*^ti for all j 4 j*, j *» 1 and 5 in this example,,
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VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 SUMMARY
The artillery system is built around a mix of varying types and
calibers of artillery weapon batteries. The mix is chosen so that
adequate and continuous firepower can be brought to bear on all targets
occurring within and from the FEBA forward to some specified minimum-
acceptable maximum range. Supporting the artillery batteries, and
logically included in the artillery system for costing, are such items
as shipping, support equipment and vehicles, and support personnel.
For example, ship-to-shore transfer vehicles and helicopter units make
up some portion of the artillery system. However, only that portion
of the support effort spent on artillery is attributable for costing
purposes, and is part of the joint cost problem associated with most
systems.
A method for evaluating and comparing alternatives is
MINIMIZE: System Cost





where the cost of the alternative is here defined as a vector of two
components £ and Y_ which represent the variable cost per engagement and
the non-engagement system cost, ( _C, Y_ ) , Effectiveness constraints
are defined as the firepower required to achieve the specified number
of casualties in each scenario. Achieving the required number of
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casualties in a scenario results in combat attrition on the system and
a number of expected expended rounds from which a variable cost per
engagement is derived a
The decision criteria are based on a study of the plot of variable
cost per engagement versus the non-engagement system cost for each
scenarioo Specifically, the decision criteria is:
— Select that alternative j* such that ( C t Y).* / ( C t Y )
.
for all j £ j*, that is, select j* such that its cost vector
absolutely dominates the cost vector of all feasible alternatives,
— If no one alternative dominates, then implement secondary decision
criteria based on
- probabilities of conflict in each scenario
- probabilities of numbers of engagements per year
- evaluation of mobility vectors
6 C 2 CONCLUSIONS
The evolving complex artillery system of the future requires a
complete cost/effectiveness model for evaluating the entire artillery
system under the operating environmental conditions it will likely
operate in„ The method of minimizing expected variable cost per
casualty and non-engagement system cost, while meeting minimum mobility
and casualty criteria and staying within budget limits, will select
an optimum alternative artillery system Defining the scenarios in
terms of average rainfall, temperature, and terrain slope provides
standard environments for comparing alternatives.
Determining detailed costing matrices for the current artillery
batteries and support agencies is necessary for several reasons. The
matrices will reveal items common to all artillery systems and which
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are not required for comparing alternative costs. Costing matrices
will be useful in developing marginal costs for additional artillery
units of the present types. Finally, the matrices will have utility
in preparing accurate, reliable cost estimating relationships between
research and development costs, investment costs, and weapon character-
istics. These relationships will be necessary for developing future
alternative systems.
Should no alternative prove absolutely dominant in variable cost
per casualty and non-engagement system cost, the secondary decision
criteria presented which are based on mobility and/or future expected
numbers of engagements will select an optimum system.
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VII AREAS OF CONSIDERATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In the process of developing this paper, several subjects have
presented themselves for further consideration, the first being the
interaction of the artillery system with the naval gunfire support
system and the close air support system,, What should the future
artillery system look like in light of tactical air which includes
armed helicopters and the new OV-10, intermediate domain weapons
such as the proposed LFSW/LANCE weapons, LAW and MAW? Included
should be a sensitivity analysis on the total weighted variable cost
and average mobility times T by varying the numbers of engagements
per year and varying the probabilities of the scenarios
„
Detailed costing matrices and the CER's discussed in Chapter IV
require development in conjunction with the evaluation of current
experimental artillery prototypes A cost-effectiveness study of
prototypes versus estimated characteristics and costs should be
developed^ Does it always pay to build a prototype model?
Finally, the effects of the fire control system to include the
detection, location, and identification of targets should be studied
in relation to the artillery system How accurate is target detection
and location? How much does target location error vary and how does
it vary as a function of range from the observer and range from the
gun position? How does it vary from scenario to scenario? To what
range are targets profitably detected, i e e t at what range does the
artillery system become saturated with targets? What effects do the
built-in time delays of the fire control system have on the expected
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This formulation is a standard derivation and is taken from
source documents s [16, 18] The assumptions are as follows:
1 Targets are circles with aim points at the center^
2 The error in locating the center of the target will be
distributed normally about the true center of the target
with standard deviation (T*L = target location error,
3e The round impact points are also distributed normally about
the aim point with a standard deviation d independent
of location error.
4 The probability that a given round impacts within a given
small region of the target is small,
5, Personnel comprising the target are randomly distributed
throughout the target area A and the individual round mean
area of effectiveness MAE is small compared to A
fc6
Utilizing these assumptions, the actual impact points are distributed
normally about the target center Xi/ith the standard deviation of each round
^\T^Z 2 + On ' = °' 85 CEP
The rounds are considered nearly independent and the coverage is nearly
uniform,, From this the expected fraction of casualties is
f - 1 - exp( - n MAE/At )
n = number of rounds expected to fall in the target area
n = N Pr where
N = total number of rounds fired
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Pr the probability that any round fired falls into the
target area and is a function of the target radius R.
and <P-




Substitute Pr and n into f, take the natural logarithms and
N = - At In (1 - f ,) where
Pr MAE
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